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Abstract 
Speculation and Volatility in the Crude Oil Futures Market 
Yun Pan 
Speculative activity is often claimed to be the cause of high price and turmoil in the 
crude oil futures market. We use Working's T and a new speculative index to measure the 
degree of speculation in the crude oil futures market. We find that the variation in the 
volatility of the crude oil futures market can be explained by the variation in the 
speculative index, but the economic significance of this relationship is quite low. Granger 
causality tests show that changes in the degree of speculation lead to changes in volatility 
in the crude oil futures market, but reverse relationship does not hold. In addition the 
causality effect is weak. After the Commodity Futures Modernization Act was enacted, 
speculative activity played a more important role in explaining futures market volatility, 
and other fundamental factors' explanatory power decreased significantly. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In recent years, the public has seen a sharp increase in the price of crude oil. The price 
has increased from $10 per barrel in 1998 to over $145 per barrel in July 2008 (see Figure 
1). Because crude oil is the "black blood" of the industry, its historical high price has a 
huge impact on the economy and everyone's life, thus leading to a hot debate about the 
cause and consequences of this phenomenon. 
Some people argued that market fundamentals are the cause for high crude oil prices. 
The supply is stable, and the demand is continuously increasing. Not having found big oil 
fields for more than two decades decreases the probability of future increases in supply. 
The huge increase in demand from emerging markets is the main force that has driven the 
price to record highs. 
Other people claimed that such a rapid increase cannot be fully explained by market 
fundamentals. Because of the price discovery mechanism of the crude oil futures market, 
the industry has been viewing the futures price as a reliable estimate of the future spot 
price. The crude oil futures price is actually used as a benchmark for the spot price. They 
argued that rampant speculation in the crude oil futures market resulted in historical high 
futures prices, which in turn led to high spot prices (e.g., Masters (2008a, 2008b)). 
Each party to the debate brought some data to the public to support their arguments. 
However, these data are more of a descriptive nature. In order to obtain a more reliable 
picture of the dynamics in the crude oil market, we need to identify the essence of market 
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variables and investigate the relationship between these variables. 
In order to quantitatively measure the degree of speculation in crude oil futures 
markets, we recall a traditional speculative measure - Working's T, and review its 
characteristics and applications. We also identify some shortcomings of Working's T, and 
present a new speculative index, which has a straight-forward derivation and relatively 
clear economic meaning. Based on very limited information released by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), it is difficult to derive a perfect speculative index. 
However, we believe, using Working's T and our new speculative index together, we can 
more reliably measure the degree of speculative activity. 
Some researchers have addressed the relationship between speculation and market 
price movement in crude oil futures market (e.g., Sanders, Boris and Manfredo (2004)). 
Our focus is to examine the relationship between degree of speculation and futures price 
volatility. We want to know whether the variation in the degree of speculation explains the 
volatility of the futures market. If such a relationship exists, we also want to identify the 
cause-effect relationship. 
In addition, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (referred to as CFMA 
hereafter) is claimed to have created the so-called "Enron Loophole". Big banks make 
over-the-counter (OTC) transactions with institutional investors, and then use massive 
long positions in commodity futures contracts to offset their short positions that result 
from their OTC transactions. These banks are qualified as bone fide hedger under the 
CFMA, but they actually act as an intermediary for so-called index traders to speculate or 
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invest. We want to investigate whether there is a structural change in the crude oil futures 
market after the CFMA was enacted. Because the CFTC only releases the Commitment of 
Traders (COT) report for the crude oil futures market, with index traders still classified as 
hedgers, we can not separately test the behavior of index traders, or re-classify index 
traders into the speculative category. This limits the strength of our tests. However, we 
believe it is still beneficial to examine the effect of the CFMA under the current data 
constraints. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature. Chapter 3 describes the data. Chapter 4 presents the methodology. The empirical 
results and discussion are provided in Chapter 5. The paper concludes in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 A Traditional Speculative Measure - Working's T 
The development of Working's T 
After examining some agricultural futures markets, Working (1960) found that the 
amount of long speculation, measured by the dollar value of open speculative contracts, 
differed greatly between commodities, and the difference in the amounts of speculation 
depend mainly on the amounts of hedging in the market. He also found a close 
correspondence between changes in the amounts of speculation and hedging. These facts 
led Working to the conclusion that futures markets are primarily hedging markets. 
Working's analysis was based on the regularly published COT reports by the 
then-current administration. However, because of minimum reporting levels, the positions 
of non-reporting traders were unknown. The non-reporting traders accounted for a large 
proportion of the futures markets, thus influencing the ability to make inference. In order 
to alleviate this problem, Working had developed a technique to allocate the unreported 
positions to reporting categories, and used a special survey with complete information on 
positions to test the validity of his allocation method. 
Working"claimed that, because long hedging and short hedging cannot exactly match 
in time, they are partially offset. The un-offset part needs to be covered by speculation. 
The long speculation provided support to short hedging that is not offset by long hedging, 
and short speculation offered support to long hedging that is not offset by short hedging. 
Then Working argued that total hedging, rather than net hedging is the better measure of 
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hedging demand. Based on this inference, through regression analysis and mathematical 
derivation, Working presented a speculative index (which was referred to as Working's T 
by later researchers) as follows: 
cc 
T = 1 + when HS > HL 
HS + HL 
sr 
T = 1 + when HS < HL 
HS + HL 
SS refers to Short Speculation, SL refers to Long Speculation, HS refers to Short 
Hedging, and HL refers to Long Hedging. 
The above formula has the form of scaling by total hedging, which was consistent 
with Working's inference that total hedging is the measure of hedging demand. Working 
calculated the five-year average speculative index for eleven agricultural futures markets, 
and found that the overall degree of speculation in agricultural markets is quite low. 
Working's T has been widely used in previous research. However, there are some 
problems with this index. First, the derivation of the index is not straight-forward. Hence, 
we do not know the exact economic meaning of the index, thus limiting its use. In addition, 
Working's T is better used as a relative measure. For example, if Working's T for a specific 
market is 1.3, we need to compare this number with historical numbers, and then conclude 
whether the degree of speculation has changed. If Working's T increases by 10%, can we 
infer that the degree of speculation has increased by 10%? It is difficult to say because we 
do not know the exact meaning of Working's T. Second, the total amount of hedging has 
been cited by many previous researchers to be a better measure of hedging demand or 
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market activity than net hedging. However, theoretically speaking, the real demand for 
speculation is somewhere between total hedging and net hedging. The long hedging and 
short hedging are always partially offset. The long hedging and short hedging after 
offsetting provide the actual demand for short speculation and long speculation. 
Chart 1 Read Hedging Demand in Futures Market 
Short hedging: sssssssssfsssssssssssss 
Long hedging: lllllllllllll |m| 
Short hedging after offsetting: |ssssssssssss 
Long hedging after offsetting: |1 II111 
Actual demand for Long speculation: |1111111111111111 
Actual demand for Short speculation: ssss 
* The words in gray are matched and offset hedging. 
Of course, the CFTC does not provide the details of positions, and we do not know 
the proportion of matched hedging. This ideal speculative index can not be developed with 
the currently provided COT data. 
According to the above analysis, we expect a new speculative index which has 
straight-forward derivation and clear economic meaning. We can test how Working's T 
and this new speculative index behave, and how they explain or correlate to other 
important market variables. 
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Working (1960) opened the door to the quantitative investigation of the degree of 
speculation of commodity futures markets, primarily agricultural futures markets. The 
researchers who followed Working (1960) focused on two themes. The first theme was to 
examine the validity of Working's T, apply this index to assess the adequacy of 
speculation of a certain futures market, and investigate the relationship between the 
speculative index and other market variables. The second theme was to develop an 
estimation technique to examine the composition of unreported positions, in order to 
estimate a complete distribution of positions to facilitate further research. 
The applications and discussions of Working's T 
Peck (1979-1980) investigated the relationships between commercial use and total 
market activity in agricultural and non-agricultural futures markets. She found that total 
hedging is more correlated to total market participation measured by total open interest 
than is net hedging. When studying the seasonality of annually produced, continuously 
consumed commodities, she found that the huge growth in exports and hence in 
commercial long hedging has offset the storage-related, short hedging needs, and the 
commercial use is nearly balanced as in grain markets of interest. Though'the pattern of 
futures markets has changed in many aspects, her study was still shown to "lend support to 
the Working definition of an appropriate measure of hedger demands upon a market. Net 
hedging is not the most useful view of the demands that commercial users make on a 
market. Speculation is needed to offset both long hedging and short hedging. Only 
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coincidentally are long and short hedgers sufficiently alike in date and amount to be 
offsetting, although increased balance increases the probability of such correspondence 
and differences in seasonal needs between long and short hedgers decreases this 
probability. The appropriate measure of minimum required speculation must at least begin 
with total hedging demand." (1979-1980, p.339) 
Peck (1981) examined changes in the levels of speculation in the wheat, corn and 
soybean futures markets from 1964 to 1977. She found significant declines in speculation 
in these markets. In order to investigate how the decline in speculation influenced the 
futures price variability, Peck regressed a proxy of price variability on the speculative 
index. Because the COT Report was released monthly at that time, she used the monthly 
average of daily trading ranges as a proxy for futures price variability. The control 
variables included the proxies for scalping and new information. Peck found a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient for the speculative index. Since decreases in 
speculation are significantly associated with increases in the average daily trading range, 
Peck argued that declines in speculation had a clear influence on market performance and 
speculation became inadequate. As the robustness tests, Peck used some other forms of 
speculative indices in the above regression, such as short speculation and long speculation, 
both in actual levels and as percentages of open interest. The results were quite similar. 
Sanders, Boris and Manfredo (2004) examined the COT Reports for crude oil, 
unleaded gasoline, heating oil, and natural gas futures contracts from 1992 through 1999. 
They examined the collection procedures for the COT data and had the following findings. 
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First, the data provided no information about the motives of non-reporting traders except 
that their positions were below the CFTC reporting level. Second, pure hedge positions 
were a subset of reporting commercial category, and reporting commercial classification 
may reflect a diverse set of motives. Third, reporting noncommercial positions were 
probably the most precise category, which captured the positions of a pure subset of 
speculators. 
Sanders, Boris and Manfredo (2004) then used Granger causality tests to check 
whether there exists a Granger causality relationship between trader positions and market 
prices. They found a positive correlation between market returns and noncommercial 
traders' positions, and a negative correlation between market returns and commercial 
traders' positions. In addition, positive returns led to an increase in noncommercial net 
long positions in the following week and a decrease in commercial net long positions. 
However, in general, traders' net positions do not have predictive power for market 
returns. 
Sanders, Irwin and Merrin (2008) investigated the adequacy of speculation in 
agricultural futures markets. The CFTC provided more information about traders' 
positions through the Commitment of Index Trader and Bank Participation reports for 
agricultural futures markets, thus offering new opportunities for deeper research of 
relevant areas. They found that index fund positions have stabilized as a percent of total 
open interest after huge increases from early 2004 till mid-2005. No significant changes or 
shifts are revealed by traditional speculative measures like Working's T. They found, in 
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most markets, an increase in short hedging had equaled or surpassed the increase in long 
speculation. The speculative measures adjusted for index trader positions are still within 
the historical ranges. Sanders, Irwin and Merrin inferred that long-only index funds may 
be a good thing in markets traditionally dominated by short hedging. The administration 
needs to consider the potential benefits offered by index traders when considering 
measures to curb speculation. 
Estimation Technique for non-reporting positions 
Larson (1961) and Rutledge (1979) suggested procedures to allocate the positions in 
the non-reporting category to hedging and speculation categories. Sanders, Irwin and 
Merrin (2008) just allocated the non-reporting traders' positions to the commercial, 
non-commercial, and index trader categories in the same proportion as observed for 
reporting traders. 
2.2 A New Speculative Index 
Dr. Latha Shanker proposed a more natural and straight-forward speculative index, 
which has clear economic meaning. This speculative index also relies on the findings that 
commodity futures markets are primarily hedging markets, and speculation follows 
hedging demands. 
Chart 2 Derivation of a New Speculative Index 
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* HL refers to Long Hedging, HS refers to Short Hedging, SL refers to Long Speculation, 
and SS refers to Short Speculation. 
Let consider two cases. The first case is when short hedging dominates long hedging. 
The short hedging that is not offset by long hedging is HS-HL. In an ideal situation, the 
minimal SL required is equal to HS-HL. Of course, this ideal situation requires some 
assumptions that short hedging and long hedging have a perfect match in time, only differ 
in quantity, and long speculation has a perfect match in time and quantity with residua] 
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short hedging HS-HL. Of course, these assumptions of perfect matching over time are not 
realistic in practice. But it makes sense to be an ideal situation and the origination of a new 
speculative index. Because perfect matching will not occur, the actual long speculation is 
always greater than the minimal required long speculation, and the excess amount of long 
speculation equals to SL-(HS-HL) = SL+HL-HS = SS, just the amount of actual short 
speculation. We further scale this excess amount of long speculation by all the long 
positions required in the ideal situation, which just equals to short hedging. Then we get a 
new speculative index SS/HS. 
The second case is when long hedging dominates short hedging. The long hedging 
that is not offset by short hedging is HL-HS. In an ideal condition, the minimal SS 
required is equal to HL-HS. This ideal situation requires same unrealistic assumptions as 
mentioned above. Because perfect matching will not occur, the actual short speculation is 
always greater than minimal required short speculation, the excess amount of short 
speculation equals to SS-(HL-HS) = SS+HS-HL = SL, just the amount of actual long 
speculation. We further scale this excess amount of short speculation by all the short 
positions required in the ideal situation, which just equals to long hedging. Then we get a 
new speculative index SL/HL. 
Now let us compare this speculative index with Working's T in the case that HS > HL. 
SS 
New Speculative index = 
HS 
SS 
Working's T = l + 
HS + HL 
First, let us compare the origin of the indices. The minimum value for the new 
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speculative is zero, which occurs when SS equals to zero. The minimum value for 
Working's T is 1, which also occurs when SS equals to zero. According to the market 
identity HS+SS = HL+SL. SS equals to zero only when HS is perfectly offset by HL and 
SL, which is unrealistic. In short, the minimum number for the two indices is unreachable 
in practice. 
Second, the derivation of Working's T involved regression analysis and mathematical 
derivation, which is not clear and straight-forward. The derivation of the new speculative 
index only uses market clearing identities, which is much more straight-forward than that 
of Working's T. 
Third, the new speculative index has a very clear economic meaning. We scale 
unnecessary long speculation by all ideal long positions in the market. If the new 
speculative index equals to 0.3, we know that unnecessary long speculation equals to 30% 
of short hedging in a market dominated by short hedging. If the new speculative index 
increases by 10%, we know that holding short hedging constant, the short speculation (or 
unnecessary long speculation) increases by 10%, or non-matching between short hedging 
and long hedging increases roughly by 10%. 
On the other hand, considering Working's T, HS+HL in the denominator, appears to 
be a direct reflection of total hedging as a measure of hedging demand rather than net 
hedging, thus having some theoretical appeal. However, HS+HL has direct economic 
meaning only when HS and HL are perfectly unmatched. Being perfectly unmatched is 
even more unrealistic than being perfectly matched or offset. If we want to use actual total 
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hedging demand to scale SS, we should use unmatched parts of HS+HL rather than 
HS+HL. And using HS+HL may lead to underestimation of the degree of speculation, and 
difficulties in explaining the economic meaning of the index and changes in the index. As 
we mentioned before, it is difficult to explain the economic meaning of a value for 
Working's T of 1.3 and a 10% increase in Working's T. In addition, SS can be considered 
as unnecessary SL, and is essentially based on the net hedging concept. However, HS+HL 
is based on total hedging concept. A fraction with SS in the numerator and HS+HL in the 
denominator has very confusing economic meaning. 
Next let us compare the new speculative index with Working's T using numerical 
examples. We consider three cases. 
First case, we consider the origins of the two indices. Suppose short hedging 
dominates long hedging. Long speculation is exactly equal to the demand by short hedging 
that is not covered by long hedging. HS=100, HL=50, SL=50, SS=0. In this case, there is 
no excess speculation. 
Working's T = 1 +0/( 100+50)= 1 
New speculative index = 0/100=0. 
Second case, long speculation exceeds the demand by short hedging that is not 
matched by long hedging. HS=100, HL=50, SL=100, SS=50. 
Working's T= 1 +50/( 100+50)= 1.3333 
New speculative index=50/l 00=0.5 
Comparing the above results with the first case, Working's T gives the impression that 
14 
the excess speculation is 33.33%, while the new speculative index shows that the excess 
speculation is 50%. In the formula of Working's T, HS+HL=150 cannot be considered to 
be an accurate measure of total hedging demand. 
Third case, long speculation exceeds the demand by short hedging that is not matched 
by long hedging and increases to 200. HS=100, HL=50, SL=200, SS=150. 
Working's T = 1 +150/( 100+50)=2 
New speculative index = 150/100=1.5 
Comparing the above results with the first case, Working's T gives the impression that 
the excess speculation is 100%, and the new speculative index shows that the excess 
speculation is 150% 
These three cases illustrate that Working's T may underestimate the degree of 
speculation in the futures market. 
2.3 Degree of Speculation and Volatility 
Using daily and weekly data for crude oil, heating oil and gasoline, Pindyck (2004a) 
examined the role of volatility in short-run commodity price dynamics and the 
determinants of volatility. He found that the market variables (such as spot price, 
inventories, production and convenience yield) and macroeconomic variables (such as 
interest rates) do little to explain the behavior of price volatility for crude oil and heating 
oil, and that volatility can be viewed as exogenous. 
There are many other papers which addressed the volatility in the crude oil spot or 
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futures market. Some papers analyzed the relationship between crude oil price volatility 
and other market variables such as volume, supply and demand (e.g., Foster (1995), Yang, 
Hwang and Huang (2002)). Some papers examined the explanatory power of speculative 
index to some price variability measures in agricultural futures market (e.g., Peck (1981), 
Leuthold (1983)). However, we have not found papers directly investigating the 
relationship between degree of speculation and volatility for crude oil futures markets. 
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Chapter 3 Data 
3.1 Commitment of Traders Data for Crude Oil Futures 
We downloaded COT data for crude oil futures from the website of the CFTC, and 
obtained 710 weekly observations from March 21st 1995 to March 10th 2009. The report 
date (as of date) of COT data is every Tuesday, and the release date is every Friday. 
CFTC.gov says: "The COT reports provide a breakdown of each Tuesday's open interest 
for markets in which 20 or more traders hold positions equal to or above the reporting 
levels established by the CFTC. The weekly reports for Futures-Only Commitments of 
Traders and for Futures-and-Options-Combined Commitments of Traders are released 
every Friday at 3:30 p.m. Eastern time." These 710 COT observations are used to calculate 
speculative indices. 
We checked the reliability of the COT data, and found three problems. First, 16 
continuous observations (between January 25th 2000 and May 23rd 2000) are missing. 
The response from CFTC said that the delta factors are needed to calculate the 
Futures-and-Options-Combined COT reports. Because the delta factors supplied by the 
NYMEX on its daily tape to the CFTC did not agree with those published by the exchange 
for this period, the COT reports for that period were not officially released. 
Second, among a total of 710 observations, eleven observations have an as of date 
which is not Tuesday, i.e., eight observations on Monday, two on Thursday, and one on 
Friday. But they are in the same report week. Third, two Tuesday (as of date) reports are 
replaced by advance Friday (as of date) reports respectively, thus leading to two 
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observations in one week. We just deleted these two advance Friday observations in order 
to avoid un-matching problems with other variables. 
3.2 Crude Oil Futures Price Data 
We collected daily futures price data from the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) website. From 6514 daily observations which are from April 04, 1983 to March 24, 
2009, we extracted weekly data by the following means. First we looked for Tuesday 
observations. If Tuesday observation does not exist for a specific week, we use the 
Monday just before that Tuesday. If Monday does not exist either, we use Wednesday, and 
then Thursday and Friday. Finally we obtained 1356 weekly observations from April 04, 
1983 to March 24, 2009. Among these observations are 1341 Tuesday observations, 6 
Monday observations and 9 Wednesday observations. These 1356 observations (which 
have a longer time period than the COT data) are used to estimate conditional variances of 
futures prices. 
3.3 Crude Oil Spot Price Data 
We collected daily spot prices of crude oil from the EIA website. From 5959 daily 
observations which extend from January 02, 1986 to March 24, 2009, we extracted weekly 
data by the same method as described above for futures prices. We obtained 1213 weekly 
observations. Among these observations are 1205 Tuesday observations, 7 Monday 
observations and 1 Thursday observation. 
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3.4 Other Control Variables 
In order to find the net explanatory power of speculative indices for futures market 
volatility, we need to use control variables. Besides futures market speculation and spot 
market volatility, the fundamental factors such as supply and demand are also likely to 
influence futures market volatility. Input to refineries can be a proxy for demand, and 
stock (inventory), domestic production, and import and export can be proxies for supply. 
Chart 3 Independent and Control Variables of Futures Market Volatility 
Considering both data availability and correlation between proxies, we use the 
following control variables. 
S Proxies for stock: Weekly U.S. Crude Oil Ending Stocks Excluding Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve (Thousand Barrels) and Weekly U.S. Crude Oil Ending Stocks 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (Thousand Barrels). 
S Proxy for import and export: Weekly U.S. Total Crude Oil and Petroleum Products 
Net Imports (Thousand Barrels per Day). 
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•S Proxy for production: Weekly U.S. Crude Oil Field Production (Thousand Barrels per 
Day). 
•S Proxy for demand: Weekly U.S. Crude Oil Inputs into Refineries (Thousand Barrels 
per Day). 
We downloaded the data for these control variables from the EIA website, and 
obtained 1383 weekly observations from August 20, 1982 to March 20, 2009. But since 
the control variables are only used with speculative indices, we only need 710 weekly 
observations for the same time period as COT data. The default as of date is Friday. 
Because we could not find daily data for these variables, Friday data are what we can 
obtain. The summary statistics for all the raw data are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 includes three sections: Crude Oil Futures Market Positions, Crude Oil 
Futures Price and Spot Price, and Other Control Variables. The data series were carefully 
created and checked by the respective administrations due to the extreme importance of 
crude oil market and data's widely use in various researches. We also examined all the 
identity relationships between market positions, such as the relationship that all reportable 
long positions plus all non-reportable long positions should be equal to the total open 
interest, and did not find noticeable problems. 
Some other variables such as cuts to output by the OPEC are also recognized as 
influential factors in crude oil markets by previous research. We do not include these 
variables for two reasons. First is the data unavailability. We could not find the weekly 
data. Some of these variables have monthly series, others have only annual data. Second, 
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these variables are more likely to influence the long-term equilibrium rather than 
short-term price dynamics in the crude oil futures market. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Calculation of Speculative Indices 
We followed the definition of Working'T and the new speculative index as follows: 
SS 
when HS > HL: New Speculative index = 
HS 
cc 
Working's T = 1 + — 
HS + HL 
SL when HS < HL: New Speculative index = 
HL 
ST 
Working's T = 1 + 
HS + HL 
In addition, among 710 COT observations, 572 observations have HS greater than or 
equal to HL, 138 observations have HS less than HL. 
As of the treatment of non-reporting positions, we follow Sanders, Irwin and Merrin 
(2008), and allocate the non-reporting traders' positions to the commercial, 
non-commercial, and index trader categories in the same proportion as observed for 
reporting traders. 
In order to estimate the potential influence of this procedure on the reliability of the 
derived HS, HL, SS and SL, we present the proportion of non-reportable positions (long 
and short) to the total open interest in Figure 2. From 1995 to 1997, the average proportion 
(for'non-reportable long or non-reportable short) was about 20%. From 1998 to 1999, 
however, the proportion decreased dramatically to less than 10%. After that, the 
proportion decreased gradually to 2%~3% in 2008 and 2009. We do not know the actual 
composition of non-reportable traders, but considering that for the major part of our data 
the proportion is less than 10%, the potential bias from our allocation procedure is likely to 
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be limited. We also expect the CFTC to make a complete market survey at a future date, so 
we can actually test the accuracy of this procedure. 
4.2 GARCH Model to Estimate Conditional Variance of Futures Price 
In order to obtain a stationary time series, we calculate the logarithm of the futures 
price, and then difference it. We use the GARCH (1,1) model proposed by Pindyck (2004b) 
as follows: 
Mean equation: Log _ price change = mean + et 
Variance equation: hl =c + a * + b* 
ht is the estimated conditional variance series, st is the error term. The mean, a, b 
and c are the parameters. 
Besides conditional variance estimates, we also use the squared futures return, as a 
measure of futures market volatility, in robustness tests. The summary statistics for 
speculative indices and volatility measures are shown in Table 2. Figure 3 and Figure 4 
present the two speculative indices and conditional variance estimates along with the time 
axis. 
4.3 Linear Regression Models 
In order to identify the explanatory power of the two speculative indices to futures 
market volatility, we construct the following four models. Model 1 and Model 2 use 
conditional variance estimates as the volatility measures for the futures market, and 
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regress the volatility on the new speculative index (Model 1) or Working's T (Model 2), 
and on other control variables. Model 3 and Model 4 use the squared futures return as the 
volatility measure for the futures market, and regress it on the new speculative index 
(Model 3) or Working'T (Model 4) and on other control variables. 
Model 1: 
ht = J30 + /?, * tnew + fi2*S ret _ squared + /?3 * Stock _ no _ SPR +/?4 * Stock _ for _ SPR 
+/?5 * Pr oduction + fi6* Net _ Im port + /?7 * Input + £t 
Model 2: 
ht = /?„ + /?, * tM +fi2*S ret _ squared + /?3 * Stock no _ SPR + ft4* Stock _ for _ SPR 
+P5 * Pr oduction + * Net _ Im port + /?7 * Input + et 
Model 3: 
F ret _ squared = /30 + /?, * tnew + fi2* S ret _ squared + /?3 * no _ SPR 
+/?4 * Sfoc* _ for _ SPR + yflf5 * Pr oduction + pb * Net _ Im port + /?7 * Input + ^ 
Model 4: 
F ret _ squared = /?0 + /?, * toM + fi2* S ret _ squared + /?3 * Stock _ «o _ 
+/?4 * S/odt _ / o r _ + * Pr oduction + fib* Net _ Im port + p1 * Input + et 
ht is the estimated conditional variance for the crude oil futures market, and 
F _ ret squared is the squared return for the futures market. tneK refers to the new 
speculative index, and told refers to Working's T. S ret squared is the squared return 
for the crude oil spot market. Stock_no_SPR refers to the U.S. Crude Oil Ending Stocks 
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Excluding Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and StockJor SPR refers to U.S. Crude Oil 
Ending Stocks Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Production refers to U.S. Crude Oil Field 
Production. Net Import refers to U.S. Total Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Net 
Imports. Input refers to U.S. Crude Oil Inputs into Refineries. 
The CFMA was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 
December 2000, just before Christmas recess. This act is often claimed to have created the 
Enron Loophole, which opened the door for big banks to help index traders to take huge 
speculative positions. Banks subsequently hedged their positions with index traders in the 
futures markets. The positions of these banks were treated as hedging positions in the COT 
Reports. We want to examine whether the passage of the CFMA changed the pattern of the 
volatility-speculation relationship in the futures market. So we use December 25th, 2000 as 
the cut-off time point, split the data, and run the above four regression models for each part 
of the data. 
4.4 Granger Causality Test 
In order to test whether the change in futures market volatility is caused by the change 
in speculative indices, we run the Granger causality test. The basic model is as follows: 
Test of whether x Granger causes y is an F-test of whether = b2 = ... = bL = 0 in the 
regression: 
L L 
y , = « o + I X v < - , 
;=i /=i 
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The failure to reject the null hypothesis that bx = b2 =... = bL = 0 means lack of 
Granger causality from x to y, i.e., x does not Granger cause y. 
We actually run two models: 
L L 
Model 5: Futures _Volatilityt = aQ + ^  a Futures _ Volatility. + ^ bi Speculative _ Index t_j 
1=1 ;=i 
Model 5 is used to test whether the change in speculative index Granger causes the 
change in volatility of the crude oil futures market. 
L L 
Model 6: Speculative _ Indext = a0 + ^ToSpeculative_Indexl_i + ^btFutures_Volatility 
/--i /=i 
Model 6 is used to check whether the change in volatility of the crude oil futures 
market Granger causes the change in the speculative index. 
4.5 Treatment of Multicollinearity 
When we conduct linear regression models as discussed in section 4.3, we find high 
variance inflation factors, which is a sign of multicollinearity. The correlation matrix for 
all dependent and independent variables supports this judgment. Because the treatment of 
multicollinearity is a very important part of model selection, we include a brief discussion 
of multicollinearity in this methodology section, rather in the empirical results section. 
Multicollinearity occurs when independent variables in the regression model are 
highly correlated with each other. Multicollinearity results in spuriously insignificant 
predictors (which should be significant, but are insignificant due to high standard errors). 
On the other hand, multicollinearity indicates that some independent variables share the 
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same information. 
Though multicollinearity poses a threat to the reliability of coefficient estimation of 
our regression, it provides an opportunity to try different set of independent variables, drop 
redundant independent variables, thus resulting in parsimonious, intuitive and 
easy-to-explain models. 
As mentioned above, multicollinearity can be detected by variance inflation factors 
and a correlation matrix. Generally speaking, a good candidate predictor to keep is the 
independent variable that is highly correlated to the dependent variable and less correlated 
with other predictors. In our context, we want to test the significance and explanatory 
power of speculative indices. So the control variables that are less correlated with the 
speculative index are preferred as well. 
According to the correlation matrix in Table 3, PRODUCTION is highly correlated to 
almost all predictors, so it is the first candidate to drop. STOCK FOR SPR and 
NET IMPORT are also likely to be dropped. 
Since the correlation matrix only shows pairwise correlation, there may also exist 
correlation among more than two predictors. The variance inflation factors (VIF) can 
detect pairwise and "multiple" correlation. The rule of thumb is that VIFs greater than 5 
are worthy of notice. Some people argue that VIFs greater than 10 are noticeable. Other 
people claim that for weaker models, VIFs greater than 2.5 need treatment. For each 
regression (combination of model and data set), we try dropping independent variables 
with high VIFs to see whether we get a more meaningful model. The final models are 
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shown with regression results in Table 4. 
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Chapter 5 Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1 Regression of Volatility Measures on Speculative Indices 
According to Model 1, we regress conditional variance estimates of futures prices on 
the new speculative index and other control variables. The coefficient of the speculative 
index is statistically significant, and the t-value is 6.41. Other control variables, except for 
inputs into refineries, all have significant coefficients. The F-value of 23.48 supports the 
overall significance of the set of independent variables. The explanatory power of the 
whole regression is 13.80%. In another word, 13.80% of variation in conditional variance 
estimates can be explained by the variation of the new speculative index. 
According to Model 2, we regress conditional variance estimates of futures prices on 
Working's T and other control variables. The coefficient of Working's T is also significant, 
but the significance level is slightly lower than that for the new speculative index. Other 
control variables, except for input into refineries, are significant, and the significance 
levels are similar to Model 1. According to the adjusted R squared, 13.65% of variation in 
the conditional variance estimates can be explained by the variation of Working's T. 
After finding the statistical significance of the new speculative index and Working's T 
in explaining the futures market volatility, we are interested in their economic significance. 
In Model 1, the coefficient of the new speculative index is 0.00469. So when the index 
increases from the first quartile (0.216643) to the third quartile (0.506610), the conditional 
variance increases by (0.506610-0.216643)*0.00469=0.00136. If we ignore the curvature 
of the square root function, the conditional standard deviation increases by about 0.0369. 
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Compared with such a big hypothetical change in the index, the increase in volatility 
seems relatively small. 
For Working's T, we have similar results. When Working's T increases from the first 
quartile (1.103228) to the third quartile (1.260627), the conditional variance increases by 
(1.260627-1.103228)* 0.00907=0.001428. The approximate increase in standard 
deviation is 0.03778. 
Model 3 and Model 4 are the robustness tests for Model 1 and Model 2. We regress 
squared futures returns on speculative indices and control variables. Squared spot returns 
become the most significant explanatory variables in these two equations. The new 
speculative index and Working's T become marginally significant. Because the squared 
spot return explains most of the variation in the dependent variable, the explanatory power 
and significance level of the new speculative index and Working's T are quite low. 
However, the significance level of the new speculative index is still a little higher than 
Working's T. Due to the very high explanatory power of the squared spot return, the 
overall R squareds of model 3 and model 4 are 50.97% and 50.94% respectively. 
5.2 Regression of Volatility Measures on Speculative Indices on Split Data 
According to Model 1 and Model 2, we regress estimated conditional variance on 
speculative indices and control variables on split data, and the results are shown in Table 5. 
After comparing the coefficients and corresponding significance levels, we can make 
some inferences. After CFMA was enacted, the new speculative index changes from an 
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insignificant factor to a significant factor. In another word, the speculation in crude oil 
futures market began to have explanatory power. Squared spot returns became more 
significant, which may imply that the futures market was more integrated with the spot 
market. Ending Stock excluding SPR becomes less significant, but Ending Stock for SPR 
becomes significant. Input to refineries becomes less significant, and its coefficient 
changes in sign. The overall explanatory power decreases from about 20% to 15%. 
According to Model 3 and Model 4, we regress squared futures return on speculative 
indices and control variables on split data. We found in both parts of the data, the 
speculative index (new speculative index or Working's T) is not statistically significant. It 
seems strange that we found significance of the speculative index on all data but not on the 
spilt data. One of the possible explanations comes from the statistical property of OLS 
regression. On either part of the data, the observations are clustered, like clustered points 
on a scatter plot. It is difficult to find the fitted linear model for each part. But if we 
combine the split data (or use the full data), there may be two clustered regions on the 
scatter plot, and easy to draw the fitted line. This explanation may infer that the 
observations did change in some respects. Of course, this is just one of many possible 
explanations,"and subject to validation. Before the validation, it is difficult to make further 
inferences. Though the speculative index is not significant before and after CFMA, its 
significance level becomes higher after CFMA was enacted. 
Squared spot returns become less significant after CFMA was enacted, which looks 
contrary to the results based on estimated conditional variance. However, considering that 
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the overall explanatory power of models decreases from 82% to 46% and squared spot 
returns is the only significant predictor on the post-CFMA data, the relative significance of 
squared spot return in the model does not decrease. In addition, after CFMA was enacted, 
the Ending Stock without SPR becomes insignificant. 
Comparing all results on the split data, we can identify some systematic patterns. 
After CFMA was enacted, the overall explanatory power of the models decreases, but the 
absolute and relative significance of the speculative index increase. We can infer that in 
the post-CFMA period, speculation plays a more important role in explaining futures 
market volatility, and other fundamental factors' explanatory power decrease dramatically. 
We have to emphasize that we get this finding when index traders' positions are 
categorized as hedges. If we can get separate data for index traders and classify them as 
speculators, we may find that speculation plays an even more significant role in explaining 
futures market volatility dynamics. 
5.3 Granger Causality Test Results 
According to Table 6, it is difficult to identify the Granger Causality relationship for 
one week lag. Nevertheless, for two and three week lags, we can find that the change in the 
speculative index leads to change in the conditional variance, and the causality does not 
exist for the opposite direction. In addition, the significance level of the causality 
relationship is low. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we use the new speculative index developed by Dr. Latha Shanker and 
Working's T to measure the degree of speculation in the crude oil futures market. We 
estimate the conditional variance of crude oil futures prices, and also use squared futures 
return to measure the volatility of the futures market. We find the variation of futures price 
volatility can be explained by the variation of speculation as measured by speculative 
indices, but the economic significance of this relationship is quite low. 
We also find that, after the Commodity Futures Modernization Act was enacted, 
speculation has become a more important factor in explaining the futures market volatility, 
and that the explanatory power of other fundamental variables decreases dramatically. 
Through Granger causality tests, we find the change in speculation does lead to 
change in volatility in futures market for the second and third week lag. However, the 
cause-effect relationship is weak. In addition, such a causality relationship does not exist 
in the opposite direction. 
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Table 4 Regression of Volatility Measures of Crude Oil Futures Market 
On Working's T or New Speculative Index 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Conditional variance Conditional variance Squared Futures Squared Futures 
estimates of futures estimates of futures Return Return 
price price 
Intercept 0.00635 (2.39 )**' -0.00273 (-1.16) 0 .00667(1 .44) 0.00208 (0.51) 
N e w speculative index 0.00469 (6.41)*** 0 .00239(1.87)* 
Working's T 0 .00907(6.31)*** 0 .00434(1 .73)* 
Squared Spot Return 0.07838 (7.08)*** 0.07861 (7.09)*** 0.50684 (26.28)*** 0.50729 (26.30)*** 
Stocks Excluding 1.226671E-8 1.259326E-8 2.592326E-9 2.755013E-9 
SPR2 (2.81)*** (2.88)*** (0.34) (0.36) 
Stocks for SPR -1.71162E-8 -1.7I787E-8 -1.08197E-8 -1.03599E-8 
(-5.88)*** (-5.82)*** (-2.13)** (-2.01)** 
Inputs into Refineries 1.033459E-7(0.79) 9.918433E-8 (0.76) -2.74318E-8 (-0.12) -2.96333 E-8 (-0.13) 
F value 23.48 23.19 146.98 146.78 
Adj R-Sq 0.1380 0.1365 0.5097 0.5094 
1 The number in parentheses is the t value. *** refers to the 99% confidence level, ** refers to the 95% 
confidence level, and * refers to the 90% confidence level. 
SPR refers to Strategic Petroleum Reserve. It may seem strange that we include Stock no SPR and 
S t o c k f o r S P R in one model. But the correlation between these two variables is only -0.3777, they are 
not highly correlated, and thus are not different proxies for the same economic variable. 
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Table 5 Regression of Volatility Measures of Crude Oil Futures Market on Working's T or 
New Speculative Index on Split Data1 
Variables Before CFMA After CFMA Before CFMA After CFA 
Dependent Conditional Conditional Conditional Conditional 
Variance Variance Variance Variance 
Intercept -0.01657 (-1.73)* 0.01518(4.25)*** -0.01759 (-1.17) 0 .00940(2 .46)** 
N e w Index 0 .00465(1 .30) 0.00301 (2.95)*** 
Working's T 0.00477 (0.66) 0.00583 (2.92)*** 
S ret squared 0.04953 (2.22)** 0.07770 (5.83)*** 0.04999 (2.24)** 0.07775 (5.83)*** 
Stock_no_SPR 1.74574E-8 1.300737E-8 1.764101E-8 1.340583E-8 
(2.94)*** (2.05)** (2.96)*** (2.12)** 
S t o c k f o r S P R -2.54704E-9 -1.35898E-8 -8.53602E-9 -1.37087E-8 
(-0.18) (-3.71)*** (-0.62) (-3.69)*** 
Input 9.86575E-7 -5.87584E-7 9.884127E-7 -5.94026E-7 
(5.49)*** (-2.77)*** (5.49)*** (-2.81)*** 
F value 15.59 15.94 15.27 15.90 
Adj R-Sq 0.2072 0.1504 0.2036 0.1500 
Variables Before CFMA After CFMA Before CFMA After CFMA 
Dependent F ret squared F ret squared F r e t s q u a r e d F ret squared 
Intercept -0.00134 (-0.11) 0 .01310(2.09) -0.00302 (-0.16) 0 .00828(1 .23) 
N e w Index 0.00192 (0.44) 0.00267 (1.49) 
Working's T 0.00267 (0.30) 0 .00475(1 .36) 
S ret squared 0.98557 (36.06)*** 0.43212(18.49)*** 0.98575 (36.06)*** 0 .43252(18 .49)*** 
S t o c k n o S P R 1.56132E-8 -3.65923E-9 1.563786E-8 -3.13013E-9 
(2.14)** (-0.33) (2.14)** (-0.28) 
Stock_for_SPR -4.7731E-9 -1.02402E-8 (-1.60) -6.33945E-9 (-0.37) -9.72939E-9 
(-0.28) (-1.49) 
Input -7.40224E-8 (-0.34) -3.41964E-7 -7.38941 E-8 (-0.34) -3.62852E-7 
(-0.92) (-0.98) 
F value 265.18 75.55 265.06 75.41 
Adj R-Sq 0.8256 0.4690 0.8255 0.4685 
1 The number in parentheses is the t value. *** refers to the 99% confidence level, ** refers to the 95% 
confidence level, and * refers to the 90% confidence level. 
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Table 6 Granger Causality Test: New Speculative Index, Working's T and Conditional 
Variance1 




Conditional variance -> 
New index 
Conditional variance -> 
Working't 
i Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* 
2 Yes** Yes* N o N o 
3" Yes* Yes* N o N o 
4 Yes* N o Yes* Yes* 
1 Test of x->y is an F-test of the exclusion restrictions that bx=b2 = ... = bL = 0 in the regression: 
L L 
y, =ao + TJaiy<-i + YJbixl-i ;=i ;=i 
2 "No" means fails to reject the null hypothesis that bt = b2 = ... = bL = 0 at 90% confidence level, 
i.e., lack of Granger causality. "Yes" means rejection of null hypothesis at 90% level (*), 95% level 
(**), or 99% level (***). 
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Figure 1 Crude Oil Spot Price from January 1986 to March 2009 
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Figure 3 Speculative Indices and Conditional Volatility 
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T new refers to the new speculative index, T_old refers to Working's T, and H_T refers to the 
conditional variance estimate from the GARCH model. 
Figure 4 Speculative Indices and Conditional Volatility on Common Time Period 
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T new refers to the new speculative index, T old refers to Working's T, and H_T refers to the 
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